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Should cereal prices be stabilised? With the Sahel food crisis of 2005, fol-
lowed by soaring prices on international markets in 2008 and 2010, this is 
an increasingly pressing issue in national, regional and international policy 
debates, which address it in a uniform manner. However, the question calls 
for different analyses and responses depending on whether it concerns 
domestic markets in developing countries that are subject to food inse-
curity, domestic markets in developed countries, or international markets.
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Stabilising cereal 
prices?
The Sahel food crisis of 2005 sent shock 
waves throughout the world. Soaring prices 
on international markets in 2008 and 2010 
and the food insecurity and political instabil-
ity they generated in developing countries 
are beginning to break the taboo that has 
weighed for the last 20 years on state inter-
vention to stabilise cereal prices. However, 
debates are sometimes confused, and can be 
clarified by making a distinction between the 
stabilisation of cereal prices on domestic 
markets in developing countries, on domes-
tic markets in developed countries, and on 
international markets.
In developing countries, 
intervention is necessary
Cereal price instability poses some serious 
problems for developing countries, where 
there is considerable risk of food insecurity. 
It affects consumers, who spend a large 
proportion of their income on cereals, caus-
ing undernutrition and malnutrition. This 
may lead to political instability, such as the 
urban riots in some 40 developing countries 
sparked by the price hikes of 2008. Price 
instability also affects farmers, who suffer 
from price drops. It discourages investment, 
which impedes agricultural modernisation 
and therefore economic development 
(Timmer, 2009). Yet, from the English corn 
laws to Asia’s green revolutions in rice, suc-
cessful experiences of modernising cereal 
production have almost always gone hand in 
hand with producer price stabilisation poli-
cies (price floor).
To solve the problems created by cereal price 
instability, some suggest providing aid to 
vulnerable households (safety nets, food 
aid). The effectiveness of these instruments 
is nevertheless limited by the cost and the 
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imprecision of targeting. When the number 
of households requiring aid is high, it may 
be more effective to stabilise prices (New-
bery, 1989). By reducing the frequency and 
magnitude of price hikes, action on prices 
would bring down the number of house-
holds vulnerable to food insecurity and 
thereby increase the effectiveness of safety 
nets. Moreover, in countries that have not 
yet achieved their green revolution, it is also 
necessary to protect farmers from price 
drops. Stabilising cereal prices within devel-
oping countries is therefore a necessity.
There are two major obstacles to the imple-
mentation of such policies. First, many 
developing countries lack the means to 
finance these policies. Certain exceptions 
include countries with mineral resources, 
such as Zambia, which financed maize price 
stabilisation with revenue from copper. 
Second, the State may give in to pressure 
from the streets or lobbies and take untimely 
measures, which disrupt markets: fearing 
State intervention that could lead to price 
drops, private operators refrain from storing 
or importing, which may increase price 
instability.
These two obstacles could be removed by 
creating an international fund to finance 
cereal price stabilisation policies in develop-
ing countries. This fund would be reserved 
for the most fragile countries and would 
finance only credible stabilisation projects. 
State intervention would be launched 
according to simple rules known to all to 
ensure that it is predictable and that private 
storage is not discouraged. For example, the 
State would only intervene if the price left a 
predetermined band. 
In developed countries,  
a risk of drift
The renewed debate on cereal price stabilisa-
tion in developing countries has led some 
experts and lobbies to advocate a return to 
price stabilisation in developed countries. 
This is especially true in the European 
Union, with the preparation of the post-
2013 CAP.
A different approach is nevertheless required 
for these countries. Unlike developing coun-
tries, cereals account for a very small propor-
tion of household expenditure; rising cereal 
prices will not result in food security prob-
lems or urban riots. There are consequences 
for farmers and agricultural investment, but 
to a lesser extent. Indeed, developed coun-
tries have achieved the structural transfor-
mation of their economy: productivity gains 
in agriculture have had knock-on effects in 
other economic sectors, especially through 
increasing income and demand, and through 
lower input costs (Timmer, 2009). In addi-
tion, unlike their counterparts in developing 
countries, farmers in developed countries 
can protect themselves from the risk of price 
drops by using futures markets. Since the 
decoupling of CAP aid in 2003, European 
cereal farmers are increasingly using this 
type of tool. By combining a put option and 
a call option, they can even benefit at almost 
no cost from a floor price, as long as they 
accept a ceiling price.
Moreover, in developed countries, a public 
price stabilisation mechanism runs the risk 
of being turned into a price support mecha-
nism. The organisation of cereal farmers into 
powerful lobbies, added to the low impact 
of high prices on consumers, may lead pol-
icy-makers to overvalue floor prices. This 
would lead to inefficiency on three levels: 
economic inefficiency, as the surpluses gen-
erated would be sold on international mar-
kets with the help of costly subsidies, 
generating unfair competition for develop-
ing countries; social inefficiency, as aid based 
on price support would be of greater benefit 
to large-scale farmers; and environmental 
inefficiency, as subsidised prices would pro-
vide incentives to increase production, 
regardless of the damage caused to the envi-
ronment.
The expected benefits of grain price stabili-
sation are therefore relatively low for devel-
oped countries. Given the costs and the risk 
of drift associated with these policies, it is 
almost certainly better to avoid them.
On international markets, 
intervention is desirable  
and feasible
There is little doubt that relatively stable 
international prices are desirable. The main 
argument (already evoked by Keynes in 
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At the international 
level, attacking 
the causes of hikes 
and increasing 
the level of global 
grain stocks.
Some experts suggest tightening World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules in order 
to prevent countries from disconnecting 
themselves from the international market, 
especially by limiting the right of countries 
to restrict their exports. This approach seems 
somewhat unrealistic, as many countries are 
opposed to such a revision of WTO rules. 
Even if such rules were adopted, it is unlikely 
that they would be respected. If rice prices 
soar on international markets, governments 
of rice exporting countries would choose to 
violate WTO rules rather than compromise 
food security in their country.
Intervention to stabilise prices on interna-
tional markets therefore seems more desir-
1942) is that faced with instable interna-
tional prices, countries are encouraged to 
disconnect themselves from the interna-
tional market. The 2008 crisis was a striking 
example of this: faced with soaring prices, 
many countries restricted their grain exports, 
while others implemented self-sufficiency 
strategies. These policies further increase 
international price instability: in 2008, 
export restriction measures considerably 
amplified international rice price hikes, 
thereby penalising importing countries 
(Headey, 2011). Self-sufficiency policies 
mean international markets become nar-
rower and therefore more volatile. More 
broadly speaking, countries disconnecting 
themselves from the international market 
harm resource allocation: cereals are no 
longer produced where production costs are 
lowest, which increases the cost of food.
Sources: IMF for prices, and USDA for stocks.
International maize prices increase only when stocks are low  
(1960-2008)
able than ever to restore countries’ faith in 
the international market. However, such 
intervention is considered unfeasible by 
most experts because of the failure of inter-
national commodity agreements (coffee, 
cacao, natural rubber, tin, etc.) that were 
abandoned in the 1980s (OECD, 2011). 
However, if these agreements failed, it is 
above all because their main objective was 
to support prices rather than to stabilise 
them, which led to excessive stocks (cacao) 
or to tension between exporting and import-
ing countries (coffee). The failure of inter-
national agreements does not therefore 
prove that it is impossible to stabilise inter-
national prices around their long-term 
trend.
Moreover, establishing public stocks man-
aged at the international level is not the only 
type of action that can be undertaken to 
reduce international price instability. More 
modest and realistic action can be taken to 
reduce the frequency and magnitude of price 
hikes: action attacking the causes of hikes, 
such as the increase in demand for maize 
from the biofuels industry or excessive spec-
ulation on futures markets; and action aimed 
at increasing the level of global grain stocks.
Increasing global stocks implies public 
action as, for staple food products such as 
cereals, private storage is not enough to 
build up sufficient reserves. However, it is in 
each individual country’s interest to let other 
countries bear the burden of storage. Only 
an international agreement sharing the 
burden of cereal storage will therefore make 
it possible to increase the level of global 
stocks and to guarantee that they will not 
fall below the minimum level required to 
avoid price surges.
Modernising agriculture  
and improving food security
Cereal price stabilisation seems necessary in 
developing countries, but uncalled for or 
even risky in developed countries. Where 
should the boundary be placed between 
these two groups of countries? Where should 
emerging countries be positioned? Two cri-
teria can be used to assess the relevance of a 
stabilisation policy for a given country. The 
first concerns the share of cereals in house-
hold expenditure. If this is high, there is a 
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food security issue; policies aimed at keeping 
prices below a ceiling are justified. The 
second criterion concerns the characteristics 
of farms. If their productivity is low, it is 
necessary to stimulate investment by keeping 
prices above a predetermined floor. In coun-
tries where traditional and modern agricul-
ture coexist, it is preferable to develop 
targeted aid.
Cereal price stabilisation policies must be 
understood from a dynamic perspective. 
Indeed, they are aimed at enabling structural 
change: the modernisation of cereal produc-
tion, which will result in a long-term reduc-
tion in prices and will have knock-on effects 
for the rest of the economy. This implies that 
the range of intervention prices must follow 
the long-term price trend, and that the 
mechanism must be phased out as the 
desired structural change takes place.
Finally, it seems that national or regional 
stabilisation policies are not enough to 
manage instability when it is imported from 
international markets: some countries are 
unable to protect themselves from it; and the 
policies implemented by other countries may 
increase international price instability. 
Action at the international level is therefore 
needed to reduce this instability. Such action 
is feasible as long as its objective remains 
modest. The level of commitment from the 
international community nevertheless 
remains well short of what is needed, as 
shown by the recent plan of action resulting 
from the meeting of G20 agriculture min-
isters on 22 and 23 June 2011 in Paris. n
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